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Are Commodity Prices fortelling Deflation?
In the lastfew months, prices ofcommodities such
as gold, industrial raw materials and agricultural
products havedeclined significantly.The declines
have been interpreted by many observers as fore-
telling deflation. The observers have gone on to
claim thatthisdeflation is dueto "extremelytight"
monetary policy by the Fed. Within this context,
this Letter discusses the need to distinguish be-
tween absolute and relative prices ofcommodi-
ties. Some prices may indeed fall although the
aggregate price indexes show small (or no) in-
creases. Ouranalysis indicates that the decline in
the relative priceofsome commodities has been
due to commodity-specific factors and has quite
different implications for monetary policy than
declines due to an environmentofwidespread
deflation.
What the data show
Often, the evidence provided by those predicting
deflation has been restricted to movements in the
prices ofindividual goods. Amongthe price de-
cI ines quoted are the 15 percentfall in the priceof
gold futures over the period from May 1984 to the
beginningofJuly 1984 and the coincident 20 per-
centdecline in the priceofsoybean futures. Some-
times, certain price indexes are mentioned as
well. For example, the 16 percent decline in the
Economist's IndexofIndustrial Commoditiesfrom
the end ofMarch to the end ofJune has been
quoted in the press.
These figures present a picture that contrasts with
that shown by the aggregate indexes. The Con-
sumer Price Index, for example, has risen by 1.4
percent from February to july 1984, while the
Producer Price Index (PPI) has increased by 1per-
cent over the same period. Neither movement is
evidence ofdeflation. However, these small in-
creases hide the varying behavior ofprices in dif-
ferent sectors ofthe economy. Thus, while the
Price Index for Industrial Commodities showed
(small) increases each month in 1984, the Price
Index for Agricultural Commodities fell nearly 2
percent from March to june 1984.
To understand the causes ofthis apparent contra-
diction, it is necessary to focus on the distinction
between relative and absolute prices. An examin-
ation ofthe aggregate PPI reveals that the increase
in the PPI for agricultural commoditieswas slower
than the increase for the aggregate index from
January 1979 to January 1984. Thus, the price of
agricultural commodities relative to othercom-
modities in the PPI has been falling since 1979,
and this decline in their relative price has contin-
ued over the period March-June 1984. However,
overthe latterperiod, the aggregate PPI has stayed
approximately.constant, while the PPI for agricul-
tural commodities has declined.
A little reflection will show that the stabilityof the
aggregate index is extremely important in under-
standing the recent decline in the absolute prices
of agricultural commodities. In particular, when
theoverall inflation rate is low (as represented by a
stable aggregate index), an increase in the supply
of(or adecrease in the demand for) a particular
commodity (wheat, for example) is quite likelyto
lead toadecrease in its absoluteprice. This differs
from what is likely to happen when the rate of
inflation is high. In such asituation, an increase in
the supply ofwheat will not (unless it is extremely
large) show up in a decrease in its absolute price.
Instead, wheatpriceswill just increase moreslowly
than prices ofother commodities. The same de-
cline in the relative price ofwheattakes place in
both cases, butabsolute prices behavedifferently.'
Previous experienceeasily bears out this assertion.
For example, between ji)nuary 1979 and January
1980-aperiod ofhigh inflation-the absolute
price offarm products increased by 2.6 percent.
However, over the same period, the priceof farm
products relative to the price of industrial com-
modities (excluding fuel) fell by 9.4 percent. A
similar decrease in this relative price took place
from March to June this year, but because ofthe
low-inflation environment then prevailing, the
relativepricedeclineof4 percentwas matched by
an absolute price decline ofapproximately the
same amount. (Thedecliningrelative priceoffarm
products is, in fact, a problem that has been
around for several decades due to factors quite
unrelated to monetary policy.)
Consider, next, the decline in industrial raw ma-
terials prices. Chart 1plots the Producer PriceFRBSF
Index for Industrial Raw Materials while Chart 2
plots the price of Raw Materials relative to the
price ofall industrial commodities (the price of
fuel is excluded from both). Chart 1 indicates that
the absolute priceofIndustrial Raw materials is
fairly volatile. The currentdecline is therefore not
unusual; there have been large and sustained de-
clines in the past, for example, in 1976 and 1977.
Chart2 shows thatthe relative price moves around
as well. The present situation is unusual only be-
cause the level ofthis relativeprice is lowerthan it
has been in the past.
Why some relative prices have declined
What factors are responsible for the historically
lowrelativepricesofsomecommodities?The level
of interest rates is one. As an illustration, consider
thedecline in thepriceofgold. A high interest rate
raises the opportunity cost ofholding gold. With
Treasury securities yielding close to 13 percent
and inflation expected to remain at the 5 percent
level,gold is profitableto hold onlyifit is expected
to appreciate at least8 percentfaster than the price
level. There seems little reason to expect this to
happen, especially when the relevant supply-side
factors are considered. For example, ithas been
pointed out that South Africa-the principal non-
Communist supplierofgold-isso beset with
economic problems that itcan no longerwithold
supplies to steady the market.
What is true ofgold is also true ofother precious
metals. With financial assets offering high real
rates, the demand for real assets has plummeted.
In general, any real asset that is to be held over a
particular period (say, a year) must be expected to
appreciate enough to offset the loss from not
holding interest-bearingfinancial assets instead. If
the future priceofa real asset cannot be expected
to be high enough, individuals will begin to sell
that real asset. The resulting decrease in real asset
prices continues to the pointwhere the return on
holdingreal assets equals thaton holdingfinancial
assets.
An immediate application ofthis principle is found
in inventory holdingbehavior. Although the
argument is usually couched in terms ofthe costs
ofholding inventories, the basic tradeoff is the
same. Thus, forexample, in the non-farm business
sector, inventory purchases declined from an
annual rate of $26.2 billion last Winter to $20.4
billion in the Spring (measured in 1972 dollars).
Another exampleofthe consequences of inven-
tory dumpingdue to high real rates is provided by
the recent decline in lumber prices. Chart 2 sup-
portsourdiscussion-sincelate 1980, the relative
price ofraw materials has been declining in
tandem with the rise in real interest rates.
A second, extremely important factor in the fall in
relative commodity prices is the rise in the U.s.
exchange rate. To see this, considerChart 3, which
plots the Economist's Index ofthe Price ofIndus-
trial materials and a (trade-weighted) dollarex-
change rate.
There are two reasons forthe inverse relationship
between the price index and the exchange rate.
First, to the extentthat the price index is based
upon sterlingprices in London, an appreciationof
the dollar implies that dollarprices ofcommodi-
ties will fall while sterling prices remain un-
changed. The second is thatan appreciation ofthe
dollarmeans that traders will find it profitable to
buy aluminum (for example) in London to sell in
the United States. This will depressthedollarprice
ofaluminum in the U.S.
Specific factors also can be found to explain the
drops in the prices ofother commodities. For in-
stance, copper supply is high because countries
such as Chile have been exporting huge amounts
to help payoffdebts. Both Brazil and Argentina
have had record soybean harvests. In the United
States, healthy corn and soybean harvests are ex-
pected to push prices even lower.
The above examples should provide ample evi-
dence to supportthe claim that relative com-
modity prices are weak due to commodity-spe-
cific factors. Furthermore, relative price declines
are not historically unusual. However, because of
the lOW-inflation environment, they translate into
unusual absolute price declines. Here, the be-
haviorofthe Consumer Price Index for services
offers reassuringevidence.The index increased by
more than 2'12 percent from January to July this
year. This behavior is in line with the explanation
above, since services are, in general l immune to
effects arising from both astrongerdollarand high
interest rates.
Policy implications
Although this Letter shows that the recent decline
in commodity prices is not signalling incipient
deflation, itdoes not follow thatthis develop-
ment should be ignored. Two specific implica-
tions follow for policy.1967 = 100
Chart 1
Producer Price Index for
Industrial Raw Materials* 1967 = 1
Chart 2
Ratio of Raw Materials Price Index
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First, the current outcry aboutdeflation may indi-
cate future problems in attempting to reduce the
rate of inflation. As discussed above, a decline in
relative prices is likelyto show up in decreasing
absolute prices when the rate of inflation is low. It
appears that people are much more sensitive to a
decline in absolute prices than they are to one in
relative prices. Since relative price adjustments
will obviouslycontinuetotake place in thefuture,
the accompanying decline in absolute prices is
likelyto generate considerablediscontentin some
quarters. In such a situation, pressures on the Fed
to conduct an "easier" monetary policy are likely
to intensify.
Second, it appears thatthese declines are provid-
ing information that can be used in conjunction
with the evidence provided by bond markets to
understand the current high interest rates. In the
recent past, analysts have interpreted the high
levels of long-term interest rates to mean that
markets expect inflation to accelerate. However,
long rates provide evidence only aboutwhat
future short-term nominal rates areexpected tobe,
and no information aboutthe real componentof
interest rates. As such, conditions in the com-
modity market provide an important signal about
how much inflation is expected. The message
seems to be thatmarketsdonotexpectvery much.
The bond market's fears, therefore, have to do
with the level of real interest rates, and it appears
that market participants expect real interest rates
to remain high.
Bharat Trehan
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollar amounts in millions)











Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 180,833 -1,278 4,808 4.1
Loans and Leases 1 6 161,811 -1,252 6,456 6.3
Commercial and Industrial 48,391 - 294 2,428 8.0
Real estate 60,747 107 1,848 4.7
Loans to Individuals 29,327 96 2,676 15.3
Leases 51028 4 - 35 - 1.0
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 11,839 - 25 - 668 - 8.1
Other 5ecurities2 7,184 1 - 979 - 18.3
Total Deposits 187,947 -1,773 - 3,050 - 2.4
.Demand Deposits 43,087 -2,040 - 6,150 - 19.1
DemandDeposits Adjusted3 28,363 - 901 - 2,968 - 14.4
OtherTrahsaction Balances4 12,155 - 139 - 620 - 7.4
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 132,706 ·407 3,721 4.4
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 37,699 25 - 1,898 - 7.3
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 or more 41,135 323 2,970 11.9
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 19,385 - 492 - 3,622 - 24.0
Weekly Averages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency(-)
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 ExcIudes trading account securities
3 Excludes U.5. government and depository institution deposits and cash items
4 AT5, NOW, Super NOW and savings accounts with telephone transfers
5 Includes borrowing via FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items not shown separately